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Abstract: A Belgian manufacturing company uses pallet movers for internal transport. Despite the
company’s efforts to improve occupational safety, accidents with pallet movers remain noteworthy.
In order to control occupational accidents, it is crucial to have a clear view of the potential accident
scenarios that are present in a company. The bow-tie method is a way to capture and visualize these
accident processes in an integrative way. Included in the bow-tie are safety barriers (both technical as
organizational and human) and management delivery systems that can intervene in these accident
processes. Once bow-ties are composed, they are an excellent point of departure to assign indicators
to the safety barriers and management delivery systems in order to control (i.e., prevent or mitigate)
accident scenarios. Two types of indicators can be distinguished. Firstly, there are general indicators
that are assigned to management delivery systems interrupting multiple accident scenarios, which can
yield a higher safety gain (as they intervene in multiple accident scenarios). Secondly, there are
scenario-specific indicators targeting one specific accident scenario, which can be valuable as they
target a specific problem in the company. For the development of the bow-ties, a multi-method
design with the inclusion of different data sources was used, leading to a comprehensive overview.
This makes the bow-tie analysis of internal transport with pallet movers transferable to other settings
where pallet movers are used for internal transport.
Keywords: manufacturing industry; bow-tie analysis; pallet mover accidents; accident analysis;
safety barriers
1. Introduction of the Study
Internal transport represents a well-known occupational hazard in many modern industrial
environments. Pallet movers (synonyms for ‘pallet mover’ are pallet jack, walkie-rider, pallet truck,
transpallet) are used for internal transport in several industries, and these machines are easy to operate,
compared to, for example, forklift trucks. However, pallet movers are inherently dangerous machines.
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They often operate close to pedestrian workers and, charged with a load, their total mass can be well
above two tons. Often, their load is not secured to the machine, leading to instability when gravity
gets a grip of the load.
The company under investigation in this study is a manufacturing plant located in Belgium,
which is part of an American multinational, producing consumer products all over the world. Pallet
movers are used frequently for internal transport. Like many major American companies, this company
also pays a lot of attention to the safety of their employees. The company uses the so-called 6W-2H and
why-why techniques to analyze its recordable accidents without or with lost work time. The 6W-2H
problem analysis produces a description of the context of accidents (what, where, which, when, who,
to whom, how, how much). The why-why analysis is performed to get to the so-called root causes
of accidents and is based on mapping of what happened during the accident process and why this
happened. Countermeasures are formulated based on the results of these accident analyzes. The entire
accident analysis is the responsibility of the supervisors, but are hereby supported by the Health and
Safety (HSEQ) staff.
According to figures provided by the European safety manager of the abovementioned
multinational, the 6W-2H and why-why techniques did not help in reducing occupational accidents
substantially. As an alternative, a bow-tie analysis is proposed, providing a detailed and comprehensive
insight into potential accident scenarios, including possible safety barriers (both technical and
non-technical) and management delivery systems which can prevent or mitigate the accident processes.
In Section 4, the choice for the bow-tie method is supported.
To test the bow-tie analysis, a pilot project was formulated, focussing on accidents during internal
transport with pallet movers. Accidents with pallet movers represent a significant share of the total
number of accidents. In the years 2015 and 2016, about ten percent of all recordable accidents with lost
work time that occurred at the European plants of the multinational involved a pallet mover.
The research question of this study is ‘Which accident scenarios are possible during internal
transport with pallet movers and which safety barriers (both technical as organizational and human)
and management delivery systems can influence (i.e., prevent or mitigate) these accident scenarios?’.
2. Background of the Plant under Investigation
At the Belgian plant, approximately 300 people are employed. Two out of three employees are
permanent (‘own company employees’) and one out of three is a contractor.
The production process is manifested on several floors. The upper floors are responsible for
supplying raw materials, the production of intermediate products, and supplying these intermediate
products to lower floors, where product finishing and packing take place. The ground floor has
production lines for finishing the products and packing lines. These lines are implanted in an existing
space which was initially not designed for that purpose.
The entire plant is characterized by a lot of load manipulation, which means that products are
stocked in many temporary buffers. For example, on the ground floor, the packing materials are
transported from the warehouse to a first large buffer (by a forklift truck), followed by transportation
from the first large buffer to a second smaller buffer (by a pallet mover), and from the second smaller
buffer to a buffer in front of the production or packing line (by a pallet mover).
The transportation routes of forklift trucks are separated from transportation routes of pallet
movers, leading to (almost) no possible contact between the two types of internal transport.
Figure 1 shows two types of pallet movers being used at the plant: Standard electrical pallet
movers and electrical stackers which can lift loads to approximately 1.8 m. Pallet movers can transport
a load of 1.2 to 2 tons, have a driving speed up to 6 km/h and a standard emergency stop. Maintenance
and repair of pallet movers are performed by the company itself on a regular basis, while inspections
are performed by an external company every three months.
Approximately 75% of the operators handling pallet movers are provided by one steady contractor
company. The contractor staff is characterized by a frequent rotation.
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Figure 2 shows the most frequent loads transported at the plant. Finished products are
not transported with pallet movers, only raw materials, intermediate products, packing material,
and off-quality products.
During the period from 2015 to 2016, eight recordable accidents occurred at the Belgian location.
In three of these accidents, a pallet mover was involved. Two of these pallet mover accidents happened
with a contractor employee, and one with a company employee.
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3. Research Methodology
To compose the bow-ties of accidents with pallet movers, a multi-method design was used.
A literature search was conducted using electronic databases of the library of the Delft University
of Technolog , the Bri ish Health nd Safety Executive (HSE), he American cupational safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), and the American National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH). Search terms were the following: ‘pallet mover’, ‘pallet jack’, ‘walkie-rider’,
‘pallet truck, ‘tr nspallet’, a d ‘accident’. Safety related articles on allet movers were rather scarce in
the literatur . Therefor , articles forklift truck accidents (u ing the s arch term ‘forklift’) were also
included in the literature study, for as far as the accident processes had similarities with the ones of
pallet movers.
Belgian and Dutch ational data on pallet mover accidents were requested. F r Belgium, data on
pallet mover accide ts are obtai ed from Fedri , the B lgian federal agency f r occupational risks.
For The Netherlands, Storybuilder is used, which is a software tool developed for the Dutch Ministry
of Social Affairs and Employment [1]. Both agencies have provided data on accidents reported to
and investig ted by the labor inspectorate. In both databases, the type of equipment involved in
the accidents can be s le ted. This equipment classification is based on the classification by ESAW
(European Statistics on Accidents at Work). Pallet movers fall under the code 11.04 (‘mobile handling
devices, handling trucks (powered or not)—barrows, pallet trucks, etc.’). It should be noted that the
data obtained does not only cover accidents with pallet movers, but also other equipment falling
under the same code. Hence, national numbers of pallet mover accidents cannot be given. However,
the databases also contain information on types of accident scenarios, root causes, and failing safety
barriers. The latter qualitative information was used to complement the development of the bow-ties.
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Documents and data concerning pallet mover safety available at the Belgian plant (and by
extension at all European plants if available) were analyzed: The material of the pallet mover training
(presentation, syllabus), an observation checklist used to evaluate the use of pallet movers (HSEQ
staff and supervisors use this checklist to evaluate the behavior of operators during pallet mover
use), the minutes of monthly safety meetings, a pallet mover maintenance checklist, the most recent
pallet mover inspection overview, a checklist for interims regarding pallet mover use, and the safety
notifications regarding pallet movers in the incident registration system. During 2015–2016, 127 safety
notifications regarding pallet movers were available at the Belgian plant comprising information on
accidents (n = 9), near-misses (n = 9), unsafe conditions (n = 93), and positive feedback to the operators
(n = 16). All available accident analyzes (the 6W-2H and why-why techniques) performed after a
recordable accident with a pallet mover were also taken into account. In Appendix A, an example of
such a recordable accident is given, containing a short description of the accident and the actions taken
in response to the accident.
At the Belgian plant, observations were being held at the workplaces of the pallet mover operators.
A personal introduction of the researchers and the purpose of the study were given before the
observations, and an introduction was given to the contractors during their daily team meetings.
Observations were complemented with interviews with operators (n = 25), team leaders (n = 5),
the HSEQ staff (n = 3), and management (n = 2). Interviews with operators and team leaders were
performed on-the-job and took approximately fifteen minutes per person. The following aspects were
addressed during the interviews:
• A job description of their tasks involving a pallet mover
• Problems and obstacles encountered during the use of pallet movers
• Facilitating aspects regarding the use of pallet movers
• Accidents, near-misses, or unsafe conditions with pallet movers
• Accidents that are most likely to occur with pallet movers
• Suggestions for improvement regarding the use of pallet movers
• Additional questions based on the observations
Interviews with the HSEQ staff and management were performed in a meeting room and took
approximately one hour per person, discussing topics as the safety management system and findings
during the fieldwork. The staff of the external company that provides the training of the pallet mover
operators was also interviewed.
4. The Bow-Tie Model
The safety metaphor used in this study is the so-called bow-tie (Figure 3). The bow-tie model
originates from the engineering domain and combines a hazard and safety barrier concept, dating
as far back as DeBlois (1926), Gibson (1961) and Haddon (1963), together with a scenario concept,
known from the Swiss cheese model of Reason (1997) [2–8]. A bow-tie model is comprised of a fault
tree (the left-hand side of the model), which represents the risk factors of a failure, and an event tree
(the right-hand side of the model), which represents the consequences of a failure [9].
The bow-tie metaphor illustrates an accident process, starting with a hazard on the left-hand side.
A hazard (or energy) is a source or a condition with the potential for causing harm. Various accident
scenarios, pictured as left-right arrows, can migrate to the center point of the metaphor, the central
event. This central event represents a state where the hazard (energy) has become uncontrollable and,
thus, becomes an undesirable event with a potential for harm or damage. The central event proceeds
the consequences at the right-hand side of the metaphor, such as causing harm to people or damage to
assets or environment.
The strength of the metaphor is its relationship between accident scenarios, technical safety
barriers, non-technical safety barriers, and management delivery systems. A scenario is a sequence
of events and conditions necessary for an accident to occur. Looking at the scenarios, two types
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of events can be distinguished. There are pre-event accident scenarios presented at the left-hand
side of the central event (leading to the central event), and there are post-event accident scenarios
depicted at the right-hand side of the central event (leading to the consequences). The technical
safety barriers, represented as the black boxes in the scenarios, are technical entities that can interrupt
the accident scenario. An example of a technical safety barrier is an emergency stop on a pallet
mover. The non-technical (or organizational and human) safety barriers are represented as the
white boxes in the scenarios, being non-technical entities that can interrupt the accident scenario.
An example of a non-technical safety barrier is the removal of leaking cubitainers (which interrupts the
pre-event accident scenario of losing control over the pallet mover due to leaked products on the floor).
The upwards arrows in Figure 3 represent the influence of management delivery systems. Management
delivery systems influence the quality (in terms of reliability and availability) of the technical and
non-technical safety barriers. For example, maintenance of the emergency stop on the pallet mover does
not interrupt the accident scenario in a direct way, but is a management delivery system influencing
the reliability of the technical safety barrier ‘emergency stop on pallet mover’. Another example of a
management delivery system is the training of pallet mover operators on removing leaking cubitainers,
which influences the reliability of the non-technical safety barrier ‘removal of leaking cubitainers’.
There are two types of safety barriers that can be distinguished. There are safety barriers to
prevent the occurrence of the central event, which are presented in the pre-event accident scenarios,
and there are safety barriers to control or to mitigate the consequences, which are presented in the
post-event accident scenarios.
The bow-tie model has a hidden time factor. Less than adequate safety barriers or management
delivery systems can be manifested over a long period of time. If a hazard becomes uncontrollable
and reaches the central event, scenarios reaching their consequences will usually unroll very quickly.
Pre-event accident scenarios may take days, week, months, or even longer, while post-event accident
scenarios develop in hours, minutes, or even shorter.
After bow-ties are developed, the next step is to assign indicators to the safety barriers and the
management delivery systems [10]. Indicators are able to visualize possibilities for improvement,
to indicate safety improvement or safety decline over time, and create benchmarking (e.g., between
different plants). Once the indicators are developed, targets and limits should be assigned to every
indicator (what is acceptable or unacceptable as a result or for instance tolerable with leeway for
improvement). Additionally, responsibilities have to be set up in order to achieve goals and to define
actions when targets are not met. According to the needs of the company, indicators can be prioritized
(which indicators are for instance more important or more feasible to implement).
Traditionally, the scope of accident and incident investigations, whether performed internally or
externally, is usually limited to investigating the immediate causes and decision making processes
related to the accident sequence. Important factors contributing to the accident are hereby often
overlooked. However, since the method used to analyze incident data and accident information
influences the proposed prevention measures, it should be of no surprise that those investigations don
not directly guide one towards the most effective improvements and solutions. On the other extreme,
methods and models to investigate the socio-technical system, such as those proposed by Rasmussen
(‘drift to danger’ model) [11], Leveson (the STAMP method) [12] or Hollnagel (the FRAM method) [13],
are often too general for the application intention, and this way surpass their goal. The bow-tie method
as employed in this research finds a way between both situations, and thoroughly investigates a
(possible) accident without being too high-level.
The majority of accident modeling techniques has been designed to address process safety.
However, most of these models tend to be also applicable to the field of occupational safety [14].
The same applies for the bow-tie model, which has entered the field of occupational safety through
the European Workgroup for development of the Occupational Risk Model (WORM), which started
with the aim of decreasing the occupational accident rate in the Netherlands by 10–15% [14,15].
The value of this model lies mainly in its suitability for qualitative analysis. In addition, bow-ties have
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been proposed for quantifying occupational risk in the framework of the WORM research project.
An initial [16] and a more general form of the model have been presented in Reference [17]. Bowties
for quantifying occupational risk have been presented in the following cases: Falls from heights [18],
falling objects [19], contact with moving parts of machines [20], activities near moving vehicles [21],
fires [22] and hazardous substances [23].
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5. Results
5.1. The Outcomes of the Current Accident Analysis in the Plant under Investigation
At the Belgian plant, pallet mover accidents are being analyzed with the 6W-2H and why-why
techniques. This accid nt analysis allows us to focus on technical, organizational and human aspects.
However, in the accident analysis of the plant, a trend of ‘blaming the victim’ can be identified.
For example, looking at the pallet mover accident as described in the Appendix A, the following
aspects can be indicated as important contributors for t e accident: The area was very crowded
creating a narrow maneuvering sp ce, the l ad hat had to be picked up was not standing in the
designated zone and the production pressure was high. The accident analysis shows that the involved
operator was personally blamed, as disciplinary measures against the operator were taken by the
contractor company.
The countermeasures that are taken based on the re ults of the accident an lysis are also mainly
directed towards the operators, such as giving personal warnings and the retraining of pallet mover
operators. The observation checklist to evaluate the behavior of operators during the use of pallet
movers is often used after an incident occurred, meaning that it is implicitly assumed that the
behavior of the operator is one of the root causes of incidents. Organization-oriented countermeasures
mainly focus on the adaptation of the working environment to create more maneuvering space and a
better overview.
5.2. Bow-Ties of Accident Processes with Pallet Movers
Table 1 presents an overview of the left side of the bow-tie: Possible hazards, pre-event accident
scenarios, preventing technical and non-technical safety barriers, preventing management delivery
systems, and central events of accident processes with pallet movers. Table 2 comprises central events,
mitigating technical and non-technical safety barriers, mitigating management delivery systems,
post-event accident scenarios, and consequences.
Tables 1 and 2 were composed based on the findings of the literature study [24–40], information
available through Belgian and Dutch national accident databases, the analysis of documents and data
available at the Belgian plant regarding pallet movers, and the results of the fieldwork (observations
and interviews).
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Table 1. The elements on the left-hand side of the bow-ties of accident processes with pallet movers based on: (1) Literature; (2) Belgian and Dutch National data;
(3) Document analysis; (4) Safety notifications in the incident registration system of the Belgian plant; (5) Accident analysis; (6) Fieldwork: Observations and interviews.
Hazard Pre-Event Accident Scenario Preventing Technical and Non-Technical Safety Barriers and ManagementDelivery Systems Central Event
• Load (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Limited sight due to height of load (1,2,3,5,6)
• Load not secured/not well secured (e.g., no cage, not
strapped) (e.g., due to production pressure) (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Load wrongly loaded (e.g., not centered, too highly
loaded, forks under width pallet instead of length,
containers not straight on each other, too heavy) (2,3,4,5,6)
• Camera on pallet mover (1)
• Mirror in workplace (1,2,6)
• Traffic management: floor markings (1,2,3,5,6)
• Use horn on pallet mover (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• clothing employees with reflective clothing (2)
• Design pallet mover (less heavy) (1)
• Bump detection (1,3,6)
• Loading correctly (e.g., no load on double pallets) (2,3,4,6)
• Secure the load (e.g., stretching, strapping, cage) (1,2,4,5,6)
• Provision of material to secure the load (6)
• Using the material to secure the load (2,4,6)
• Clear and accessible guidelines/procedures for loading (3,6)
• Training pallet mover operator (1,3,4,5,6)
• Sensitization/communication on loading (3,4,5,6)
• Planning production and staffing (sufficient time and people to perform the job) (1,5,6)
• Unstable load (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Loss of pallet mover control (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Speed pallet mover (1,2,3,4,6)
• Acceleration pallet mover (1,6)
• Driving or accelerating too fast (1,2,3,4,6)
• Due to production pressure
• Wanting to take a break faster
• Due to gross negligence (play behavior, act tough)
• Speed limitation (1)
• Acceleration limitation (1,6)
• Emergency stop pallet mover (1,6)
• Provision of a sufficient number of pallet movers (3)
• Clear and accessible guidelines/procedures on speed and acceleration (3,5,6)
• Training pallet mover operator (1,3,4,5,6)
• Sensitization/communication on speed and acceleration (3,4,5,6)
• Planning production and staffing (sufficient time and people to perform the job) (1,5,6)
• Unstable load (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Loss of pallet mover control (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Design workspace (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Limited sight due to insufficient light (1,2,6)
• Distraction due to hard/insufficient noise (1,5)
• Too narrow of a maneuvring/parking space (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Limited sight at crossings, corners, entrances/
exits (1,3,4,5,6)
• Ridges, sharp endings at infrastructure (e.g., at pallet
lift, diked areas) (4,5,6)
• Too crowded working area/buffers (e.g., too much load,
too much traffic) (2,4,5,6)
• Pedestrian or other internal transport in the zone of the
pallet mover transport (2,4,5,6)
• Unsafe location to recharge thebattery (4,6)
• Unsuitable floor material (too rough or too smooth) (2,6)
• sup>· Sufficient light (1,6)
• sup>· Ear protection (6)
• Camera on pallet mover (1)
• Mirror in workplace (1,2,6)
• Sandblasting floor (6)
• Traffic management: Floor markings (1,2,3,5,6), stop sign or other road signs (1,2,4,6),
separate pathways and lanes (1,2,6)
• Use horn on pallet mover (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Bump detection (1,3,6)
• (Reorganisation) layout (e.g., sufficient pre-defined zones for full and empty pallets or
cubitainers, as least load manipulation as possible) (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Increasing the frequency of emptying buffers (3,4,5,6)
• Shielding ridges, sharp endings at infrastructure (6)
• Clear and accessible guidelines/procedures (e.g., for maneuvring in a narrow space) (3,5,6)
• Training pallet mover operator (1,3,4,5,6)
• sup>· Provision of predefined locations to recharge the battery (6)
• Unstable load (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Loss of pallet mover control (1,2,3,4,5,6)
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Table 1. Cont.
Hazard Pre-Event Accident Scenario Preventing Technical and Non-Technical Safety Barriers and ManagementDelivery Systems Central Event
• Condition
workspace (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Floor in bad condition (e.g., holes, loose floor
plates) (1,2,3,4,6)
• Insufficient housekeeping (e.g., loads outside
predefined spaces, pallets not stacked correctly) (2,3,4,5,6)
• Insufficient cleanliness (e.g., wet floor, the products on
the floor) (2,3,4,5,6)
• Incoming rain, humidity of the workspace due to
condensation (6)
• Supervising housekeeping and cleanliness (3,4,5,6)
• Cleaning wet/dirty floor (4,5,6)
• Shield of damages and repair as soon as possible (6)
• Sandblasting floor (6)
• Lift the forks 10–20 cm while driving to avoid irregularities in the surface (3)
• Clear and accessible guidelines/procedures (e.g., on housekeeping) (3,5,6)
• Training pallet mover operator (1,3,4,5,6)
• Sensitization/communication (e.g., on importance of notifications of damaged floor, on
importance housekeeping) (3,4,5,6)
• Unstable load (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Loss of pallet mover control (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Condition material
(equipment and
load) (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Poor condition pallet mover due to absent maintenance
(e.g., malfunctioning emergency stop) (1,2,3,4,6)
• Not inspected pallet movers (3,4,6)
• Damaged load (e.g., damaged pallets, leaking
cubitainers) (1,3,4,6)
• Misfit between pallet mover and load (1,4)
• Substantial mass of pallet mover (1)
• Pallet mover or load not fit for the job (e.g., pallet mover
too wide for the workspace) (3,4,5)
• Sandblasting floor (6)
• Purchasing pallet movers that are fit for the job (3,4,5)
• Purchasing less heavy pallet movers (1)
• Purchasing loads that are fit for the job (3,4)
• Timely and adequate maintenance of pallet mover (3,4,6)
• Timely and adequate inspection of pallet movers and loads (3,4,5,6)
• Timely replacement of outdated pallet movers (3,5,6)
• Removing damaged loads (1,3,6)
• Provide inspection mark that is not obstructive during work (e.g., sticker instead of a
strap) (4,6)
• Communication with the supplier of damaged loads (3)
• Performing start-up check of pallet mover (e.g., of an emergency stop) (3,4,5,6)
• Providing clear/readable start-up checklist that is easy to fill in (3,4,6)
• Clear and accessible guidelines/procedures (e.g., on start-up check pallet mover) (3,5,6)
• Training pallet mover operator (1,3,4,5,6)
• Sensitization/communication (e.g., on not using damaged pallets, on signalising defects
at pallet movers) (3,4,5,6)
• Unstable load (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Loss of pallet mover control (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Breakdown pallet mover (1,2,3,4,5,6)
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Table 1. Cont.
Hazard Pre-Event Accident Scenario Preventing Technical and Non-Technical Safety Barriers and ManagementDelivery Systems Central Event
• Operating the pallet
mover (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Not following the safe practices for pallet mover
use (2,3,4,5,6)
• Due to ignorance or inexperience (3,5,6)
• Due to production pressure (3,4,5,6)
• Due to distraction operator (e.g., using a phone, reading
during pallet mover use) (2,4,5)
• Due to gross negligence (intoxication, play behavior,
act tough) (2,3)
• Not following the traffic rules (e.g., ignoring a stop
sign) (4,5)
• Losing control due to a physical/medical problem
(e.g., fatigue, bad eyes, concentration impaired by
medication (2,3)
• Operator in a no-go area for pallet movers (1,4,5,6)
• Unauthorised use of pallet mover (no or an expired
licence) (3,4,5,6)
• Difficult maneuvring situations (e.g., pallet needs to be
turned first) (6)
• Non-routine circumstances (e.g., maintenance machines)
whereby the usual routes cannot be taken (4,6)
• Pre-selection of pallet mover operators (3,5,6)
• Training pallet mover operator (1,3,4,5,6)
• On-the-job assistance/training of new employees (5,6)
• Clear and accessible guidelines/procedures for pallet mover use (also for non-routine
circumstances) (3,5,6)
• Sensitization/communication (e.g., on no-go areas) (3,4,5,6)
• Leadership supervision, coaching, and feedback on unsafe practices (3,4,5,6)
• Planning production and staffing (sufficient time and people to perform the job) (1,5,6)
• Sufficient predefined parking spaces for all pallet movers (3,4,5,6,6)
• Provide personal keys (3,4,6)
• Remove key from pallet mover when not in use (2,3,4,6)
• Take measures so it cannot be bypassed to start/drive pallet mover without keys (3,4,6)
• Always carry driving license for pallet mover (3,4,6)
• Visual and physical demarcation of no-go areas for pallet movers (6)
• Unstable load (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Loss of pallet mover control (1,2,3,4,5,6)
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Table 2. The elements on the right-hand side of the bow-ties of the accident processes with pallet movers based on the (1) Literature; (2) Belgian and Dutch National data;
(3) Document analysis; (4) Safety notifications in the incident registration system of the Belgian plant; (5) Accident analysis; (6) Fieldwork: observations and interviews.
Central Event Mitigating Technical and Non-Technical Safety Barriers and ManagementDelivery Systems Post-event Accident Scenario Consequence
• Unstable load (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• sup>· Application of first aid (2,4,5)
• On time (2)
• With the correct diagnose and response action (2)
• sup>· Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs) (2,5)
• Provision of PPEs (2)
• Using the PPEs (2)
• Maintenance of PPEs (2)
• Safety features on pallet mover (e.g., tilt protection, bump detection) (2,3,6)
• Protection of objects/infrastructure (e.g., with foam, with steel bar) (3,5,6)
• Loss of load (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Injury (1,3,4,5,6)
• Damage (1,3,4,5,6)
• Stop production process (4,5,6)
• Loss of control pallet
mover (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Breakdown pallet mover (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Traffic management: Separate pathways and lanes (1,2,6)
• Emergency stop pallet mover (1,6)
• Increased visibility and/or audibility of pallet mover (2)
• Application of first aid (2,4,5)
• On time (2)
• With the correct diagnose and response action (2)
• sup>· Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs) (2,5)
• Provision of PPEs (2)
• Using the PPEs (2)
• Maintenance of PPEs (2)
• Safety features on the pallet mover (e.g., tilt protection, bump detection) (2,3,6)
• Protection of objects/infrastructure (e.g., with foam, with steel bar) (3,5,6)
• Pallet mover hits
pedestrian/other internal
transport (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Pallet mover hits operator pallet
mover (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Pallet mover hits
object/infrastructure (1,2,3,4,5,6)
• Injury (1,3,4,5,6)
• Damage (1,3,4,5,6)
• Economic loss (because of a stop
of the production process) (4,5,6)
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6. Assigning Indicators to the Bow-Ties
Once the bow-ties are composed, they are an excellent point of departure to assign indicators to
the technical and non-technical safety barriers and to the management delivery systems in order to
control (i.e., prevent or mitigate) the accident scenarios. Indicators can support a company’s safety
management and provide information on a preferred safety goal.
It is important that the indicators focus on aspects that are applicable to the operating environment.
For instance, it could be an improvement to replace all present pallet movers with new, less heavy
equipment. However, in the context of the company, it is possible that this is not feasible due to
budgetary constraints. Another example is the reorganization of the layout of the floors, which is an
important aspect in order to create more maneuvering space. However, in the plant under investigation,
installations are integrated into an existing space which was initially not designed for that purpose,
leading to space constraints. Additionally, in the past years, several improvements have already been
made regarding the layout of the working space and the work floor, and there is, of course, a limitation
to the possibilities in creating more maneuvering space. A question arising from this space constraint
is whether pallet movers are the best equipment to use at particular spaces in a production facility with
limited maneuvering space and if it would not be better to search for an alternative way to transport
the material. This is related to the inherent safety of a company [41], which will be discussed at the
end of this section.
Besides the applicability of indicators in the company environment, the focus of the indicators can
also be chosen based on the presence of management delivery systems. For instance, as can be seen in
Tables 1 and 2, certain management delivery systems are present in multiple scenarios. It concerns
the following management delivery systems: ‘training of pallet mover operators’, ‘sensitization and
communication’, ‘guidelines and procedures’, and ‘planning of production and staffing’. Indicators
assigned to these management delivery systems can be considered as general indicators, as they are
linked to multiple accident scenarios. As an example, the management delivery systems ‘training of
pallet mover operators’ is further elaborated below.
Next to the general indicators, scenario-specific indicators can also be developed. Decisions on
what scenarios should be focused on can be based on the plant-specific risks regarding pallet mover
use. Two examples of company-specific pre-scenarios will be further elaborated below, being ‘narrow
maneuvering space’ and ‘leaking cubitainers’.
6.1. General Indicators: Training of Pallet Mover Operators
In Table 3, the possible indicators for the frequently occurring management delivery system
‘training of pallet mover operators’ have been elaborated. An indicator of the content of the (re)training
is proposed, and an indicator of the quality control of the (re)training. Additionally, there are indicators
regarding the coverage ratio of the training and the retraining.
Table 3. Possible indicators for the management delivery system ‘training of pallet mover operators’.
Sequentiality in follow-up
Content (re)training
Evaluation of the content of the (re)training every two years: Is the
(re)training completely tailored to the needs of the company?
(yes/no)Aspects to take into consideration:
- Use of examples of specific risks and possible accident
scenarios at the company? E.g., narrow maneuvring spaces,
wet floors, too crowded buffers . . .
- Sufficient rules and guidelines for the target audience?
Quality control (re)training
Yearly evaluation of the percentage of participants of the
(re)training evaluating the training as positively (i.e., a score of 7 out
of 10 or higher)
Coverage ratio training Monthly evaluation of the percentage of starting pallet moveroperators that are trained for pallet mover use
Coverage ratio retraining Yearly evaluation of percentage pallet mover operators receiving aretraining every five years
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It should be noted that a certain sequentiality is present in the follow-up of the indicators.
For instance, a high coverage ratio of the (re)training is negligible if the content of the (re)training is not
tailored to the needs of the company and if the quality of the (re)training is evaluated as substandard.
6.2. Scenario-Specific Indicators: Narrow Maneuvering Space
A specific risk at the plant under investigation is the narrow maneuvering space. Therefore,
this scenario was chosen to be further elaborated into scenario-specific indicators. Figure 4 shows the
bow-tie of the pre-event accident scenario of a narrow maneuvering space. Only a selection of possible
safety barriers and management delivery systems has been included in the bow-tie. Two non-technical
safety barriers have been included: ‘no pallet mover use at too narrow spaces’ and ‘correct pallet
mover use at narrow spaces’. One technical safety barrier has been included: ‘sandblasting floor’.
Sandblasting of the transportation routes with pallet movers (Figure 5) leads to a better grip and a
shorter breaking distance. The following management delivery systems have been included: ‘traffic
management’ and ‘training pallet mover operators’.Materials 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW  13 of 19 
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As w th the general indicators, a sequentiality is also present in the follow-up of the scenario-
specific indicators. For example, when a company does not include correct pallet mover use at narrow
maneuvering spaces in the training, it does not make sense to evaluate non-compliances on this topic.
6.3. Scenario-Specific Indicators: Leaking Cubitainer
Another specific risk at the plant under investigation is the worn drain valves of cubitainers,
leading to spills of liquid content (Figure 6). Products on floors lead to a longer breaking distance
and a higher chance of losing control over the pallet mover. Figure 7 presents the bow-tie of the
pre-event accident scenario of damaged loads, and more specific leaking cubitainers, complemented
with possible indicators for this specific scenario. Again, only a selection of possible safety barriers
and management delivery systems has been included in the bow-tie, namely, the non-technical safety
barriers ‘purchasing cubitainers fit for the job’, ‘removal of leaking cubitainers’, and ‘removal of
leaked product’, the technical safety barrier ‘sandblasting floor’, and the management delivery systems
‘training pallet mover operators’ and ‘traffic management’.
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6.4. Evaluation of the Indicators
Once the indicators have been determined, they have to be evaluated. Based on the specificity
of the indicator and the needs of the company, this evaluation can take place on a yearly basis, or if
needed with a lower or a higher frequency.
Additionally, after the development of the indicators, targets and limits have to be assigned to
every indicator. This means that the company has to decide what is acceptable as a result and what is
not. In the example of the coverage ratio of the training, a target could be that 100% of all pallet mover
operators should be trained for pallet mover use. In the example of the number of leaking cubitainers,
a target could be that <5% of the cubitainers is leaking.
An important aspect is that responsibilities have to be indicated: Who does what and when in
order to reach the goals of the indicators. In the example of the (re)training, responsibility has to be
indicated for the subscriptions for the (re)training. The same applies to responsibilities to take actions
when a target is not achieved.
Based on the elaborated examples, it could seem that a lot of collection and registration is needed
for all indicators. However, it should be noted that the given examples and their accompanying
indicators are very specific. Once the entire set of indicators has been developed, it will become clear
that many of them can be collected and registered under the same heading.
In order to facilitate an adequate monitoring of the indicators, a system should be set up to report
and to collect the required data. Such systems are often already (partly) present in a company.
To be complete, something should be said on the necessity of the indicators, which is a reflection
that should be made before developing the indicators. After all, it should first be analyzed if the
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processes that are present in the company are as inherently safe as possible [41]. In the given example
regarding the narrow maneuvering spaces, whether a pallet mover is the safest equipment to use
at these places (and by extension at all places) should be considered. In the example of the leaking
cubitainers, whether cubitainers are necessary and if the process cannot be designed in such a way that
the transportation of the liquid is minimalized (and by extension that a large amount of manipulation
of all loads at the plant is minimalized) should be considered. Kletz’s [42] article entitled “what you
don’t have, can’t leak” is a good resume of this matter.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
The outcomes deriving from the current accident analysis that is used at the Belgian plant under
investigation (6W-2H and why-why technique) does not seem sufficient to take adequate measures in
order to prevent accidents with pallet movers. When preventive measures are taken based on accident
analyses, several shortcomings can be identified. Firstly, preventive measures based on accident
analyzes only focus on accidents that already occurred, leaving all other potential accident scenarios
out of scope. A method that includes not only company specific data, but also generic data sources
such as the literature and national accident data, generates information on the entire accident process,
including aspects that have not (yet) occurred at a specific plant. Additionally, it can be concluded
that the recommendations resulting from the current accident analysis that is used at the plant under
investigation, are mostly individual-oriented. This is however not an intrinsic problem of the 6W-2H
and why-why technique, as this technique focusses on both technical, organizational as human aspects.
Hence, the focus on the human aspects is not a consequence of the technique itself, but of the way the
technique is applied.
To address the shortcomings of the current accident analysis, an alternative method—i.e.,
the bow-tie method—is chosen in order to address pallet mover safety. The bow-tie was chosen for
several reasons. Firstly, the bow-ties were composed using a multi-method design. This multi-method
design leads to a better comprehensiveness of the entire accident process of pallet mover use and gives
a detailed overview of what could possibly go wrong with a pallet mover. In the bow-ties, the possible
causes and consequences of potential accidents are identified. Additionally, the bow-tie includes the
influence of safety measures (safety barriers and management delivery systems) on the evolution of
accident scenarios [43].
Due to the use of a multi-method design to compose the bow-ties, not only company specific
data were included, but also generic data sources such as the literature and national accident data.
This leads to information on the entire accident process, including aspects that have not (yet) occurred
at a specific plant.
Because of the comprehensive character of the bow-tie method, the results are easily transferable
to other production facilities where pallet movers are used for internal transport, assuming that the
hazards are the same. This means that, if this study was conducted in another production facility with
similar hazards and similar a working environment, composition of the bow-ties would have led to a
similar outcome as in Tables 1 and 2 (this does not mean that the process of linking indicators to the
bow-ties is the same, as this is very company specific). In other words, the bow-tie method leads to a
general model that is transferable and applicable in every setting where, in this case, pallet movers are
being used. However, the indicators may be different.
Another advantage of the bow-tie method is that it allows us to make a clear distinction between
preventing and mitigating safety barriers and management delivery systems.
Seven hazards regarding pallet mover use could be identified based on the composition of the
bow-ties: Load, the speed of the pallet mover, acceleration of the pallet mover, the design of the
workplace, conditions of the workplace, conditions of materials (load and pallet mover), and operating
the pallet mover. Through several identified pre-event accident scenarios, these hazards can lead to
different central events: Instability of the load, loss of control over the pallet mover, and a breakdown
of the pallet mover. At their turn, these central events can lead through several post-accident scenarios
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to different consequences: Injury, damage, or economic loss. Several technical and non-technical safety
barriers and management delivery systems to prevent or mitigate the central event could be linked to
the accident scenarios.
The identified safety barriers and management delivery systems mainly focus on organizational
aspects, and, to a lesser extent, on the individual behavioral aspects of operators. The pitfall of
‘blaming the victim’, which is often present in other methods of accident analysis where there is
primarily focused on the individual behavior of the operators, is therefore reduced when using the
bow-tie method.
Once bow-ties are composed and safety barriers and management delivery systems have been
identified, indicators should be developed and monitored consequently. These indicators should be
composed based on their applicability in the company, meaning what is possible given a specific
company environment. When developing indicators, an important distinction can be made. Firstly,
there are general indicators. In the bow-ties, certain management delivery systems can be linked to
many of the accident scenarios. When indicators are developed for frequently occurring management
delivery systems, these indicators can be considered as general because they are not linked to only
one scenario. Secondly, there are scenario-specific indicators. This means that indicators are linked
to specific scenarios that require attention in a plant. With both the general and the scenario-specific
indicators, a certain sequentiality should be acknowledged in the follow-up of the indicators. For all
indicators, it is therefore important to set priorities.
To conclude, indicators are an important result of a bow-tie analysis. When a company reaches
a consensus on a set of indicators to be monitored, a unique insight is obtained on the status and
development of potential accident scenarios. Management can intervene adequately to ensure a
safe production.
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Appendix A
Table A1. An example of a recordable accident with a pallet mover at the Belgian plant (input based
on the 6W-2H and why-why analysis).
Description Accident Based on the Accident Analysis Actions in Response to the Accident
• An operator (contractor) got his foot clamped under the pallet mover,
causing him to trip and pull the pallet mover over his foot, resulting in a
contusion of his foot
Materials 2018, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW  17 of 19 
 
Appendix A 
Table A1. An example of a recordable accident with a pallet mover at the Belgian plant (input based 
on the 6W-2H and why-why analysis). 
Description Accident Based on the Accident Analysis Actio s in Response to the Accident 
• An operator (contractor) got his foot clamped under the pallet mover, 
causing him to trip and pull the pallet mover over his foot, resulting in a 
contusion of his foot 
 
• A load was urgently needed in order to avoid a line stop, so the operator 
broke with normal procedures and did not first remove the loads stocked 
in front of the load that had to be picked up 
• Therefore, he had to pass through a narrow space and did not follow the 
safe practice of walking beside and not in front of the pallet mover 
• The operator also did not follow the safe practice of keeping the pallet 
mover at arm’s length 
• There were too many loads stocked by the forklifts in the area, creating 
the narrow space (the forklift truck driver responsible for the stocking of 
the area was not consulted during the accident analysis). 
• The load that had to be picked up was not standing in the designated 
zone 
• Disciplinary 
measures against 
the operator were 
taken by the 
contractor company 
• Communication on 
the accident and 
safe practices 
• Retrain pallet mover 
operators 
• Reorganization 
layout of the zone: a 
part of the loads is 
now stocked 
elsewhere, in order 
to create more 
maneuvring space 
References 
1. Bellamy, L.; Ale, B.; Whiston, J.; Mud, M.; Baksteen, H.; Hale, A.; Papazouglou, L.; Bloemhoff, A.; Damen, 
M.; Oh, J. The software tool storybuilder and the analysis of horrible stories of occupational accidents. Saf. 
Sci. 2008, 46, 186–197. 
2. DeBlois, L. Industrial Safety Organization for Executives and Engineer; McGraw-Hill Book Company: New 
York, NY, USA, 1926. 
3. Gibson, J. The contribution of experimental psychology to the formulation of the problem or safety—A 
letter for basic research. Behavioural Approaches to Accident Research. In Accident Research, Methods and 
Approaches; Haddon, W., Suchman, E., Klein, D., Eds.; Harper & Row: New York, NY, USA, 1961. 
4. Haddon, W. A note concerning accident theory and research with special reference to motor vehicle 
accidents. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1963, 107, 635–646. 
5. Reason, J. Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents; Alderschot: Ashgate, UK, 1997. 
6. Swuste, P.; Gulijk, C.; van Zwaard, W. Safety metaphors and theories, a review of the occupational safety 
literature of the US UK and The Netherlands, till the first part of the 20th century. Saf. Sci. 2010, 48, 1000–1018. 
7. Swuste, P.; Gulijk, C.; van Zwaard, W.; Oostendorp, Y. Occupational safety theories, models and metaphors 
in three decades since World War II, in the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands: A literature review. 
Saf. Sci. 2014, 62, 16–27. 
8. Swuste, P.; Gulijk, C.; van Zwaard, W.; Lemkowitz, S.; Oostendorp, Y.; Groeneweg, J. Developments in the 
safety science domain in the fields of general and safety management between 1970–1979, the year of the 
near disaster on Three Mile Island, a literature review. Saf. Sci. 2016, 86, 10–26. 
9. Lu, L.; Liang, W.; Zhang, L.; Zhang, H.; Lu, Z.; Shan, J. A comprehensive risk evaluation method for natural 
gas pipelines by combining a risk matrix with a bow-tie model. J. Nat. Gas Sci. Eng. 2015, 25, 124–133. 
• A load was u ge tly eed d in order to avoid a line stop, so the operator
broke with normal procedures and did not first remove the loads stocked in
front of the load tha had to be pick d up
• Therefore, he had to pass through a narrow space and did not follow the
saf practice of walking be ide nd not in front of the pallet mover
• The operator also did not follow the safe practice of keeping the pallet
mover at arm’s length
• There were too many loads stocked by the forklifts in the area, creating the
narrow space (the forklift truck driver responsible for the stocking of the
area was not consulted during the accident analysis).
• The load that had to be picked up was not standing in the designated zone
• Disciplinary measures against the operator were taken by
the contractor company
• Communication on the accident and safe practices
• Retrain pallet mover operators
• Reorganization layout of the zone: a part of the loads is
now stocked elsewhere, in order to create more
maneuvring space
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